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IN 'THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
FLORENCE~ANDERSO~

Plaintiff and Respondent,

-vs.-

Oase No. 8169

LAMAR ANDERSON,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Lal\1ar Anderson, defendant and appellant, hereinafter referred to as the husband, rand Florence J. Anderson, plaintiff and respondent, hereinafter referred to
as the wife, were married one to the other at Seattle,
State of Washington, on July 16, 1936. Two sons, Craig
and Brent, 'and two daughters, Diane and Michele, were
begotten by them during said marriage. On the 26th day
of September, 1949, in the Third Judicial District Court,
State of Utah, the marriage contract was abrogated by
interlocutory divorce decree •and the parties went their
separate ways. The above mentioned begotten children

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

there and at that time ranged in age from eleven to
four years, and their custody was awarded the wife with
certain rights thereto reserved to the husband. \Ve are
not heTe concerned ·with matters pertaining to the marital
relationship, the custodial decreement, nor the separation
of the wife and husband.
The issues in this cause arise from subsequent proceedings had in the above referred to Third District
Court, the results of which were, as to the husband, a
rnoney judgment in the wife's favor in the sum of $4,484.41 for back support monies, $125.00 attorneys' fees and
costs, coupled with a thirty-day sentence of incarceration
in the county jail, suspended subject to certain conditions.
On August 11th, 1952, the wife through counsel petitioned
the court for an order to show cause (R. 17), said order
issued (R. 19), and the husband filed his cross petition
(R. 21); on August 26th, 1952, the court issued findings,
conclusions and its order as above stated. Thereafter,
upon affidavit of the wife (R. 29, 30), alleging the husband to be $200.00 in arrears of payment as of February
lOth, 1953, the court, I-Ionorable Clarence E. Baker
presiding, ordered the husband's incarceration (R. 30).
The husband petitioned the court to vacate the order
and strike the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
of August 26, 1952, and vacate the order of February 10,
1953 (R. 31); an order to show cauRe thereon issued 1Iay
4, 1953 (R. 35) ; and, on February 5, 1954, the court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Order (R. 37, 84, 86), dismissing said petition. Of this
we complain.
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The husband is not now, and he has at no time been,
in arrears in the payment of support monies. The terms
of the divorce decree and of the agreement of the parties
thereto, therein incorporated and made a part thereof,
were never violated by the husband. To the contrary, the
husband has taken it upon himself to do, and has done,
considerably more financially for the wife and the four
minor children than said decree ordered and adjudged.
~rhese allegations are amply supported by the record.
On September lOth, 1949, the wife and the husband
entered into a "Stipulation and Agreement" (R. 4),
fair, reasonable and equitable in all respects, dividing
between them the joint property by them accumulated as
a result of their joint efforts as husband and wife. The
wife, in her complaint for divorce, prayed for the approval of said stipulation and agreement dividing their
properties and providing for the support of their children (R. 2); to this the trial judge consented and in turn
ordered that each perform thereunder the respective obligations imposed upon each therein and that the support
of the minor children of the parties be paid as provided
therein. This agreement is a part of the record, pages 4
through 10 thereof; we shall refer herein only to the parts
thereof which are pertinent to the instant issue. However, in consideration of this cause, this court will no
doubt apprise itself as to the complete fairness of the
entire settlement. Pursuant to the provisions of Paragraph 4 of said stipulation 1and agreement, it was agreed
by the wife and the husband that the husband should pay
to the wife ''the sum of $200.00 per month as support
3
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money for the minor children of the parties, said payments to begin and cmnmence as hereinafter set forth."
(Emphasis added.) Paragraph 5 (R. 8) of said stipulation and agreement provides that certain income property situated in Phoenix, Arizonra, should be sold, onehalf of the net proceeds to become the property of the
wife in full payment and satisfaction of alimony, and
that the other one-half of the net proceeds thereof was to
be the property of the husband to be placed in trust with
a trust company in Phoenix, Arizona, and to he paid to
the wife at the rate of $250.00 per month for the support
and maintenance of the minor children until said fund
was exhausted, then, the husband ''shall commence to
pay to the plaintiff, Florence Anderson, the sum of Two
Hundred Dollars ($200.00) per month for the care, support and maintenance of the minor children herein."
(Emphasis added.) It was also provided in said Paragraph 5 that either party might list the said property
for sale after a date certain and that '' * * * Florence
Anderson may have the income from said property until
the same has been sold. '' This property at the commencenlent of this action had not been sold nor has it yet been
sold. That the wife was aware of and fully understood
the terms of the agreement is beyond doubt substantiated
by Exhibit '' 2 '' entered in the hearing on the original
order to show cause; therein she writes ''I understand
LaMar is working every day now and is doing well, so
wmtld you :recommend that he pay $200 per month support for the children until the property sells. * * *''
Upon the hearing of the original order to show cause
4
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fileJ by the wife, she testified that she had listed the
property, with which we are here concerned, for sale (R.
G7); that a realty company had been unable to obtain
a reasonable offer for the property (R. 67); that she had
made no money on the rental units (R. 67); that she had
to pay money out extra ( R. 67) ; that there were hack
taxes due (R. 67, 68). She offered no books of account
nor any evidence of receipts, disbursements or profit or
loss. She testified that she was employed and was earning $265.00 per month (R. 68); she alleged that in three
years she had earned $4,219.00 (R. 68). She eontended
she was $200.00 in debt (R. 69); but on cross-examination,
she said she owed $30.00 to one department store and
$60.00 to another department store, and it is not clear
what she owed on the boy's bicycle since it only appears
that $60.00 was at one time due on one bicycle and she
had $15.00 to pay on another (R. 33). She said, "I am
hopelessly in debt" (R. 68). She said she had an offer of
$1,500.00 for the property which had been rescinded (R.
69). She tendered evidence to show that the husband was
not a fit 'and proper person to have custody of the children (R. 70). She denied that she had had an offer to sell
for $8,000.00 (R. 71), but she had listed it for $10,000.00
and had been informed by a realtor that she might get
seven or eight (R. 71). She said the property had been
appraised at $2,900.00 (R. 72) whether for tax purposes
or sale is not disclosed.
The husband testified on the hearing as to his desire
to have custody of the children one month of the year
(R. 43, 44); as to his employment (R. 45, 46); as to his

5
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inability to work due to ill health (R. 46); as to his
efforts to effect a sale of the rental units in Phoenix and
as to the lack of cooperation in such efforts by the wife
(R. 46, 47, 48, 49, 50). The husband testified that the wife
told her uncle and himself that she was offered eightyfive hundred for the property at one time and that she
refused to take it (R. 48). The husband also stated that
he was advised by his attorney, the attorney that prepared the settle1nent agreement and represented the wife
in the divorce action, not to pay the support money (R.
49). The husband testified as to his knowledge of the
income in rentals from the propel't)', $150.00 to $180.00
per month (R. 51). He testified as to his earnings from
commissions and renewals in the sale of insurance (R.
57); as to the sale of the hotel property awarded hiln by
the divorce decree (R. 58); and, that he gave her that
money (R. 58). On cross-examination, it was elicited
from this witness that his earnings from his employment
were about $2,000.00 in 1949, about $2,000.00 in 1950, and
$3,166.47 minus losses on renewals in 1951 (R. 61). That
he had paid over $1,700.00 in doctor and hospital bills
in the past two years (R. 62). That if his health continued, he could make about $5,000.00 in 1952 (R. 62).
That he kept his insurance in effect for the benefit of the
children at a cost of around $60.00 per month (R. 63).
The testimony of the parties is not without conflict.
Mr. Keith Bro·wne, Attorney at Law, was called as a
witness for the defense (R. 75). It is appellant's considered opinion that the testimony of this witness is immaterial to the cause.
6
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It is apparent that the court gave no consideration
to the agreement ,of the parties; in ruling, the court said:
"I can see no reason why the defendant can't
make those payments. He has had earnings sufficient to make them and the defendant is required
to pay the whole amount of the balance due,
totaling about $4,800.00, or thereabouts, minus
whatever the difference was in the sum $2,550.00.
He should pay that up as promptly as possible,
and at the conclusion of that payment he should
pay regularly the sum of $200.00 per month.
I shall also find that the defendant is in contempt of Court and shall sentence him for such
contempt to serve thirty days in the County Jail,
and that sentence will be suspended though on this
condition:
That is, that he shall pay the sum of- well,
I don't know - he has got to pay at least $200.00,
I would say he can pay $300.00 that is $200.00 on
the cwrrent accruals of alimony and support
money, plus $100.00 to apply on this judgment for
back alimony and support 1noney. As long as he
pays the $300.00 a month he needn't serve this
sentence, but when he fails to do so this sentence
shall be instantly reinstated and may be invoked;
and he shall also pay an attorney's fee in the sum
of $125.00, and the costs of the action.'' (emphasis
added) (R. 79, 80)
The only reference to the property here involved, made
by the court, was to the effect that it should be sold immediately (R. 80).
ARGU11ENT
POINT I.
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN DENYING APPEL,
LANT'S PETITION TO VACATE THE ORDER AND STRIKE
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

7
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OF AUGUST 26, 1952 AND VACATE I'l'S ORDER OF FEBRUARY 10., 195·3.

The action commenced in the court below was an
Order to Show Cause, based upon a divorce decree, which
plaintiff incorrectly alleged provided for the payment
of $200.00 per month support n1onies co1n1nencing with
the entry of said decree, to-wit, September 26, 1949 (R.
17). The cause was not a petition to modify a decree,
and the court below erred in altering the terms of the
original decree which was based upon the facts existent
at the time it -vvas made. Cody v. Cody, 47 U. 456, 154 P.
952. So long as the original decree stands, the parties
are bound by the terms thereof; this court so held a husband, (Osmus v. Osmus, 114 U. 216, 198 P. 2d 233) and a
wife must also be so held-at least until she pleads and
proves a change in circumstances such as to require, in
fairness and equity, a change in the terms of the decree.
Osmus v. Osmus, supra, and cases there cited. This she
n1ay do by regular proceedings in an action to modify the
decree hut such a proceeding cannot be had upon an
Order to Show Cause why a party should not be held in
contempt, since the latter can only be based upon a failure to comply with the terms of an existing decreement.
We do not here contend, nor are we now called upon
so to do, that a decree of divorce in which a property
settlement agreement has been incorporated cannot be
modified. Our law provides for subsequent changes and
new orders, 30-3-5 U.C.A. 1953; but not without limitation, and a court cannot change or modify a judgment
at will.

8
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In the instant case, the decree of divorce provides,
in part:
"4. That the plaintiff, Florence J. Anderson
be not awarded any alimony and that henceforth
she not be entitled to any; the said plaintiff, having in her stipulation with the defendant, elected
to receive a cash award as alimony and as and for
complete settlement of the same as provided in
said stipulation.

* * *
''6. And it is further ordered that the provisions of said stipulation and each and every one
of them, be and the same hereby are incorporated
into this decree by this reference and made a part
hereof and that each of said parties receive the
respective shares agreed upon therein and that
each perform the respective obligations imposed
upon each therein and that the support of the
minor children of the parties be paid as provided
therein.'' (Emphasis added)
(R. 16)

The stipulation and agreement, the terms of which the
court ordered the parties to comply with provides:
'' 5. It is further agreed between the parties,
subject to the approval of the Court, that the
property described in subparagraph (c) of paragraph 3 of this stipulation shall be sold, and that
either of the parties may list the same for sale
after October 1, 1949, and that the plaintiff,
Florence Anderson, may have the income from
said property until the same has been sold.
"It is agreed between the parties hereto that
the one-half ( 1!2) of the net sales price of this
property shall be the sole and separate property
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and 1noney of the plaintiff, and that she receive
the same in full payment and satisfaction of any
and all present or future claim of alimony from
the defendant, LaMar Anderson, and that she
\Vaives any and further claim to any right to alimony.
''It is further agreed that the one-half of the
net sales price of this property hereby and herewith given to the defendant, LaMar Anderson,
shall be placed in trust with a trust company located in Phoenix, Arizona, the name of which to
be rnutually agreed upon and selected by the parties hereto, and that said one-half (V2) of net
sales price, less the costs of disbursements and
handling of the same to be paid by said trust
company, is to be paid directly to the said Florence Anderson at the rate of Two Hundred Fifty
Dollars ($250.00) per month for the purpose of
providing support money for the minor children
of the parties. That said payments of Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ( $250.00) shall be made until
the said one-half of said net sales prices has been
paid to the plaintiff herein. vVhen said one-half
of said net sales price of said property has been
fully paid to the plain tiff as herein provided, the
defendant, Lal\1ar Anderson, shall then con1mence
to pay to the plaintiff, Florence Anderson, the
sum of Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) per month
for the care, support and maintenance of the
minor children herein.''
(R. 8)
Notwithstanding the provisions of the decree and of
the stipulation and agreement as above set out, the court
below found your appellant delinquent in the payment of
support monies in the amount of $200.00 per month frorn
the date of entry of the divorce deoree for an accrued
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total su1n of $7,000.00. Set off was allowed in the amount
of $2,515.59, which represented funds donated by appellant in addition to what the decree and agreement provided for. Judgment was entered in the sum of $4,484.41
and appellant was held to be in contempt of court.
Separation agreements are not contrary to public
policy and they are generally enforced by the courts of
this country and of England (see 17 Am. Jur., Divorce
and Separation, Sec. 722 et seq.); they have been sustained by this court. Johnson v. Johnson, 107 U. 147, 152
P. 2d 426; Barraclough v. Barraclough, 100 U. 196, 111
P. 2d 792; Jones v. Jones, 104 U. 275, 139 P. 2d 222. Our
court said in the case of Iiall v. Hall, 111 U. 263, 177 P.
2d 731 at 733:
"It is true that we have held that a stipulation for an alimony settlement is only a recommendation to the court-Jones v. Jones, 104 Utah
275, 139 P. 2d 222-but we did not mean by that
that it was to be given no weight at all. Absent any
proof to the contrary the lower court should assume that the parties best know their own financial standing and capabilities, and accept their
stipulations for its face value, unless the record
before the court obviously indicates that to accept the stipulation would not accomplish equity.
To ignore the wishes of the parties without
grounds for doing so clearly is an arbitrary and
capricious act.''
The agreement between the parties here should be enforced and if there is to be subsequent change or new
order made, it must be upon proper procedure and ·only
after a showing by the moving party of a change in conditions since the entry of the decree. Gardne'r v. Gardner,
11
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111 U. 286, 177 P. 2d 743. In the case of Open~haw v.
Openshaw, 105 U. 574, 144 P. 2d 5:28, this court held that
the right of a trial court to modify an alimony or support
money award did not extend to installn1ents that had accrued; it follows, does it not, that where, as here, under
the terms of the decree, nothing had become due or had
accrued, it would not be within the province of the court
to enter judgment for a sum not owing thereunder. \Ve
think the order for the entry of the money judgment was
erroneous and sufficient ground for reversal of the court
below. I-Iowever, the finding of contempt is of equal,
if not greater, concern to your appellant.
It has been recently held that:
''Adjudication of 'contempt of court' may be
prediC'ated only on contumacious disregard of
some writ, precept, decree, order or command
emanating from court in proper exercise of its
jurisdiction.''
In re Roberts, 30 A. 2d 900, 902, 133 N.J.
Eq. 122.

Such a rule is so sound that it needs no further support.
Appellant here was to begin and co·mmence to pay to respondent the sum of $200 per month after his one-half
of the proceeds from the sale of the motel property had
been expended for the support and maintenance of the
minor children at the rate of two hundred fifty dollars
($250.00) per month. Respondent could or can now sell
the property at any time she choos.es and for any price
she can obtain and thereafter, when appellant's one-half
of the proceeds therefrom have been applied as decreed,
12
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the monthly support payments shall commence as decreed.
Otherwise, appropriate action must be taken to modify
the decree. It is respectfully subinitted that your appellant should not be held in contempt of court until and
unless he fails to do something that has been decreed
by the court he shall do. It is further submitted that your
appellant has not shown a contumacious disregard of
the decree of divorce entered against him-on the contrary, the undisputed evidence shows a performance by
appellant beyond and above the requirements of said decree.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that the respondent herein has had, and
indicates a desire further to have, more than she agreed
to accept from appellant; she would retain the property,
the income therefrom, and demand an additional monthly
sum of $200.00 from the date of the divorce. This would
give to the parties' Stipulation and Agreement and the
decree of the court no weight at all.
We submit that the trial court failed entirely to give
effect to the plain and unambiguous terms of the Stipulation and Agreement of the parties which was made,
by incorporation, a part of the decree of divorce. The
court below should be reversed and instructed to grant
appellant's petition to vacate and purge your appellant
of contempt.
Respectfully submitted,
FRED L. FINLINSON
Attorney for Appellant
312 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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